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The U.S. Navy’s answer for many future manpower and financial policy questions rests 
on the ability of the individual performance appraisal system to optimally signal officer 
productivity. This paper utilizes the economics literature on individual performance 
appraisals and promotion systems as the lens through which to conduct a comparative 
analysis between the Navy and Marine performance appraisal systems. Rating accuracy, 
differentiation of talent, and performance comparison methods comprise the bulk of the 
analysis. The results show a Marine system that exceeds the Navy’s in signal officer 
productivity. The Navy’s system provides limited assurance for rating accuracy and the 
differentiation of talent. Once insight is gained through analysis, a metric is developed to 
further improve the measurement of individual productivity. This paper recommends the 
Navy improve rating accuracy through leadership messaging, policy change, and rater 
training. Second, relative comparison methods should be required to force differentiation 
of talent and align with the Navy’s tournament theory incentive structure. Third, to 
reduce costs and improve human capital management an individual productivity metric 
should be developed that is based on the output of the performance appraisal. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The Navy spends tens of billions of dollars every year to acquire, train, motivate, 
and retain highly talented officers (Department of the Navy Financial Management and 
Comptroller, 2014). The innate talent and acquired skills of these officers produce the 
leadership and management solutions that directly affect the future productivity of the 
Navy. The challenge to incentivize and retain the most productive officers is complicated 
by competition for top talent external to the Navy. Questions are raised about the proper 
allocation of Navy manpower resources. Is the Navy identifying and retaining the most 
productive officers? What is the current level of Navy officer human capital and how is it 
trending? Could the Navy improve officer incentives at a lower cost? Can bonus policies 
be better developed that would save money while retaining more highly productive 
officers? What is the proper way to conduct force alignment with budgetary constraints? 
These and other financial management and manpower questions rely on the answer to the 
question, “How should the Navy’s performance appraisal system be used to optimally 
signal officer productivity?”  
Financial management and budget formation policy have mutual interests in 
manpower policies and programs. During fiscally constrained periods risk and human 
capital management is a challenge for the Navy’s Office of Financial Operations 
(Strather, personal communication, September 4, 2014).1 The ability to optimally signal 
officer productivity can affect force structure realignment, retention, and incentive 
policies all funded through the Office of Financial Management. Determining how to 
optimally signal productivity affects manpower policy but also allows the Office of 
Financial Management a mechanism to more effectively manage limited financial 
resources while motivating and retaining highly talented personnel. 
The performance appraisal is, “the interpretation of a performance measurement 
in terms of relative or absolute levels of effectiveness and/or the standards of 
                                                 
1 This information was communicated via PowerPoint presentation during a class lecture for the 
Conrad Seminar, Fall term, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014. 
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performance met” (Bernardin & Beatty, 1984). By observing on-the-job behavior or 
produced outcomes a determination is made reflecting the individual’s ability to meet the 
organization’s objectives (Cascio, 1998). Individual productivity in some jobs can be 
assessed objectively but most require a rater to make a subjective comparison or 
judgments on an individual’s observed behaviors or produced outcome (Pendergast, 
1999).  
I look at the existing literature on performance appraisals and then evaluate and 
compare the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps’ officer performance appraisal systems. I 
compare the elements of each system focusing on issues that help ensure optimal use of 
the performance appraisal to include rating accuracy and differentiation of performance.  
This research shows that the Marine performance appraisal system is more likely 
to produce accurate ratings that are based on merit. Both systems primarily use an 
absolute comparison method to determine individual performance using a scale anchored 
by behavioral descriptions. Additionally, the research shows that the Navy and Marine 
performance appraisal systems have drawbacks that do not optimize differentiation of 
talent despite an attempt by the Marines to counter potential raters’ leniency bias.  
Analysis in this thesis results in three major recommendations for the Navy 
performance appraisal system. 1) The importance of rating accuracy and the purpose of 
the performance appraisal should be addressed in the instruction to ensure the rater’s 
behavior is aligned with Navy manpower and budgetary strategy. 2) The comparison 
method for the appraisal of performance should be weighted toward relative comparisons. 
Relative comparisons are easier to conduct and provide the greatest differentiation of 
talent (Bernardin & Beatty, 1984; Grote, 2005). Also, relative comparisons are more 
aligned with the Navy’s tournament theory incentive structure. 3) An individual 
productivity metric based on output from the performance appraisal should be established 
to reduce costs and facilitate more efficient financial management and manpower strategy 
implementation. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review contains five sections that provide a foundation for the 
research: 1) I review incentive structures and labor market concepts needed for context 
and research support, 2) I review the purpose of performance appraisals and why 
organizations conduct them, 3) The foundational structural elements of performance 
appraisals are reviewed, 4) I review selective issues associated with rating inaccuracies, 
and 5) Lastly, I review the management of financial resources with the use of an 
individual productivity metric. 
A. LABOR MARKETS AND INCENTIVE STRUCTURES 
1. Internal Labor Market 
Labor markets are described as having either an internal or external structure 
(Doeringer & Piore, 1971). Internal labor markets are typically defined as having a 
limited number of entry points where most positions are filled from within the 
organization (Doeringer & Piore, 1971). Under an internal structure, workers have 
promotion advantages since there is no external competition for the position. There are 
also other incentives such as internal rules and customs that typically provide guarantees 
like job security or preferences based on tenure (Doeringer & Piore, 1971).  
Human capital theory focuses on two primary types of training, specific and 
general (Becker, 1993). Becker (1993) describes “specific training” as an increase in 
productivity that provides value only to a specific firm. “General training” is an increase 
in productivity that is of equal value to multiple organizations (Becker, 1993). Most 
training is a combination of general and specific characteristics (Borjas, 2010). The 
distinction is useful for the analysis.  
2. Tournament Theory 
Lazear and Rosen (1981) model a theory in an internal labor market that creates 
incentives based on relative performance called tournament theory. Tournament theory 
incentivizes individuals to perform because only the top performers will be internally 
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promoted. This is similar to sporting events where 16 teams are quickly reduced to eight, 
then four, then two and finally one by competing against each other. The absolute 
performance of each team is irrelevant for their advancement as long as they outperform 
the other team. Thus, the theory is based on relative performance not absolute. 
The effectiveness of tournament theory is based on three principles or conditions 
that must exist. They are the following: 1) Job positions are set in advance and promotion 
to those positions is based on relative performance, 2) lower level individuals are 
motivated by increasing spreads in wages associated with each advancing level, and 3) 
there is an optimal spread in wages at each level (Lazear & Oyer, 2007).  
A major variable associated with tournament theory is the amount of noise or luck 
associated with each promotion (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). The more luck involved with 
each promotion the less effort an individual will exert at each level of the tournament 
since the outcome is based increasingly on growing risk due to increasing lack of control 
(Lazear & Rosen, 1981).  
Over the last few decades research has been conducted on tournament theory 
(Green & Stokey, 1983; Nalebuff & Stiglitz, 1983; Dye, 1984; Lazear, 1989; Chan, 1995; 
Ehrenberg & Bognanno, 1990). Green and Stokey (1983) show how individual 
productivity is based on effort and some level of an unknown shock or a macro level 
event affecting productivity. Multiple shocks are very difficult for a manager to observe. 
Green and Stokey (1983) show how the use of tournament theory as an incentive can 
perform as well as or better than a time and money consuming multi-agent contract in 
eliciting worker effort.  
B. WHAT IS THE PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL’S PURPOSE AND WHY 
IS IT CONDUCTED? 
1. Accurate Measurement 
Performance appraisals should be used to accurately measure actual individual 
performance or outputs over a period of time (Longenecker & Ludwig, 1990). Some 
organizations conduct performance appraisals to improve individual and organizational 
productivity (Cleveland, Murphy, & Williams, 1989). Accuracy is critical for the 
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appraisal to be useful and to justify the required time and money for its administration 
(Grote, 2005). Some researchers state that performance appraisals create numerous rating 
errors and their use should be banned (Coen & Jenkins, 2005). Other research has 
questioned if appraisals cause more harm to an organization than the benefits they 
provide (Murphy & Cleveland, 1995). Although some have voiced their concerns, many 
organizations continue to use performance appraisals because there is no better 
alternative to measure individual productivity (Murphy, 2008). According to 
Longenecker (1989) the goal of 100 percent accuracy of performance ratings is not likely 
achievable despite decades of efforts by researchers. On the other hand, when developed 
and conducted properly, performance appraisals provide benefits to productivity and 
worker development for the organization (Longenecker, 1989).  
2. Differentiation of Talent and Traits 
Performance appraisals could be conducted to better differentiate the varying 
productivity levels of workers (Cleveland et al., 1989). According to Borjas (2010), each 
individual produces different results or outputs based on innate ability, which is seldom 
observable. Since productivity varies among individuals based on heterogeneous inputs, 
performance appraisals are an opportunity to measure variations in performance (Grote, 
2005).  
Measuring variations accurately foster a culture of meritocracy and fairness 
(Quinn, Anderson, & Finkelstein, 1998). Quinn et al. (1998) note that individuals want to 
be evaluated fairly and honestly on their performance. Great organizations do not shy 
away from merit based recognitions (Quinn et al., 1998). Productivity will vary between 
individuals; most want those differences to be recognized (Grote, 2005). Performance 
appraisals that do not differentiate communicate to workers that merit is not valued 
(Quinn et al., 1998). 
Each individual has unique and varying degrees of abilities to acquire and use 
innate skills. Performance appraisals identify these variances on the personal level 
(Cleveland et al., 1989). This information allows managers to improve counseling and 
provide training that benefits the individual (Grote, 2005).  
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3. Learning Process 
Performance appraisals enable organizations to collect and learn about individual 
productivity. Organizations hire an individual without full knowledge of the individual’s 
innate ability nor full information of the worker’s productivity (Lazear & Oyer, 2007). 
Decades of research has been conducted in an effort to better predict productivity based 
on variables such as education, training, and experience but there is still great variation 
between the inputs of these formulas and actual worker productivity (Murphy, 2008). 
Farber and Gibbons (1996) hypothesize that firms make decisions to hire individuals 
based on a function of innate ability and a set of characteristics that are observable. Faber 
and Gibbons (1996) expresses this as y = F(α,X) where y is productivity, α is innate 
ability of the worker, and X is the set of characteristics that the firm can observe. Over 
time an organization will observe an individual’s actions and behaviors. These 
observations signal an individual’s ability to apply skill, innate abilities, and 
characteristics to a specific job. Lazear and Oyer (2007) explain that these signals are 
difficult for the organization to understand since they are full of noise. Performance 
appraisals can help to minimize the noise so that proper estimates can be made about an 
individual’s abilities. Altonji and Pierret (2001) provide evidence that until productivity 
signals are collected, management discriminates across workers based on observable 
factors like education, test scores, and training. 
Individual productivity is also a function of job characteristics (Jovanovic, 1979). 
To maximize productivity the organization needs to learn over time which jobs provide 
the best fit for each individual’s abilities (Rosen, 1992; Lazear, 1998). In a labor market 
where there is a lack of complete information on workers’ abilities and underlying 
productivity, performance appraisals can allow the organization to learn the abilities of 
workers and what jobs would provide a match to maximize productivity.  
4. Managerial Decisions  
Performance appraisals provide information that managers may use to make 
critical personnel decisions that affect productivity (Cleveland et al., 1989). Theodore 
Schultz (1961) coined the term human capital. Since then research has been directed to 
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improving and investing this capital (Lucas, 1988; Mankiw, Romer, & Weil, 1992; 
Cohen & Soto, 2007).  Becker (1993) states that like other forms of capital, human 
capital yields income or other beneficial outputs. This is because human capital is the 
unique set of abilities and acquired skills that each person possesses (Borjas, 2010). 
Quinn et al. (1998) explain how human capital or intellect creates the most value in the 
economy. They state how this is easily seen in many sectors of the market including 
manufacturing. Fitz-Enz (2000) states that all assets are important for growth and 
productivity but only human capital can create value. Because of this, management’s 
decisions affecting human capital may be the ultimate determinant of productivity and 
maintaining a competitive advantage (Youndt, Snell, Dean, & Lepak, 1996). The ability 
to manage human capital and convert it into useful productivity is a critical skill for 
executive management (Quinn et al., 1998).  
5. Communication of Expected Behavior 
Performance appraisals can provide a mechanism for management to clearly 
communicate what behavior is important to accomplish organizational goals (Lucia & 
Lepsinger, 1999). They can allow managers to shape the organization around values and 
behaviors that managers decide are important. Performance appraisals can be a tool for 
managers to use to ensure alignment. Simons (2000) illustrates the importance of aligning 
behaviors with mission through “goals and plans” and “performance measures.” See 
Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.  Linking Mission with Actions 
6. Provide Feedback 
Feedback is one of the most cited purposes for conducting performance appraisals 
in efforts to improve productivity (Bernardin & Beatty, 1984). According to Landy, Farr, 
and Jacobs (1982), feedback is information that indicates the accuracy and correctness of 
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past behaviors. Landy et al. (1982) state two primary functions of feedback: 1) Informs 
individual on where to direct future efforts. 2) Provides motivation for employees. 
Feedback increases effort because individuals want their effort to be recognized (Grote, 
2005). Individuals desire to know how they have been doing and how their performance 
fares relative to others (Quinn et al., 1998). Landy et al. (1982) looked at six different 
studies and determined that feedback was correlated to improving performance from 30 
to 57 percent of the time across a variety of situations and employees.  
7. Enables Accountability 
Performance appraisals are a mechanism for managers to use to ensure 
organizational justice (Grote, 2005). Justice is defined as being treated fairly or in a like 
fashion as others. When an individual who performs poorly is not held accountable by 
management it gives a signal to other workers that inferior performance is acceptable 
(Latham & Wexley, 1994). Discrimination on factors other than merit is widely 
considered unethical in society but if actual performance is not observed then decisions 
are being based on other factors (Altonji & Pierret, 2001). Grote (2005) explains that 
efforts to conduct performance appraisals are to identify true individual performance and 
to hold workers accountable for poor and good behavior.  
C. WHAT ARE THE FOUNDATIONAL ELEMENTS OF A PERFORMANCE 
APPRAISAL? 
1. Structure 
The performance appraisal structure can be divided into three parts, the rating 
instrument, the rating procedures, and the rater. The rating instrument contains a variety 
of scales or other performance recording methods from type of anchor (behavior or 
numerical), number of scale points, number of judgments required by rater, and others 
(Landy & Farr, 1980). The rating procedures are the required actions to be performed by 
the rater during the performance appraisal process. Procedures, for example, might 
contain administrative guidance, physical location of rating, time pressure, or individual 
rater strategies (Landy & Farr, 1980). The third part of the performance appraisal 
structure is the rater. The performance appraisal instrument is only as good as the rater or 
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manager who is using it (Latham & Wexley, 1994). If a manager is not observing 
performance during the evaluation period or does not have the knowledge or skill to use 
the instrument properly then results will be less accurate (Longenecker, 1989). 
Longenecker and Ludwing (1990) show how despite a good rating instrument and 
procedure the rater’s implementation of these elements is critical to accurate ratings.  
2. Subjective versus Objective  
Performance can be determined in two ways, objectively or subjectively. Landy 
and Farr (1983) calls objective methods, non-judgmental and subjective methods 
judgmental. An objective performance measurement does not require the judgment of 
another individual to determine the level of performance. Instead, performance is 
determined by hard data collected from operation outputs. Subjective data requires a 
manager to make a comparison and then judgment. Ideally, performance would be 
measured in objective terms but in reality performance is difficult to define and measure 
(Lazear, 1998; Landy & Farr, 1980). For instance, stock prices, an objective measure, 
might be appropriate to determine a CEO’s productivity but for those below him a stock 
price is a noisy measurement (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 1994).  
Objective measures pulled from financial statements do not tell workers how to 
create value or align their behavior with management’s goals (Baker et al., 1994). 
Subjective measures more accurately align with daily behaviors that are required for 
organizational success (Baker et al., 1994). Managers are typically in positions to 
properly evaluate such daily behaviors (Baker et al., 1994). Since objective measures are 
difficult to find and are typically incomplete, subjective measures are used by most 
organizations for performance evaluations (Pendergast, 1999).  
3. Absolute versus Relative 
Individual performance is evaluated by making a comparison to either an absolute 
standard or relative to another individual’s performance. Both absolute and relative 
comparisons are valuable for a variety of reasons depending on the objectives of the 
organization (Bernardin & Beatty, 1984; Grote, 2005). The absolute method answers 
  10
questions concerning the overall level of worker productivity while the relative method 
defines who is the most productive. 
Absolute methods compare individual performance to a defined behavior 
standard. For this comparison method to be accurate the standard of behavior must be 
clearly defined and include examples of specific behavior (Lucia & Lepsinger, 1999). 
Competency models including those that use a Behavior Anchored Rating Scale (BARS) 
and other behavior related criteria are examples of absolute standards. Absolute standards 
can facilitate clear communication, motivation, behavior alignment with strategy, and the 
consistent application of standards across the organization (Lucia & Lepsinger, 1999). 
Absolute standards give management a measure to compare organizational levels 
of certain skills and abilities over time. For example, if management desired to ensure 
that the organization was improving in a certain competency they could reference the 
collective level of that competency by looking at individual levels.  
Absolute comparison methods allow for the management of an organization’s 
human capital. Similarly, absolute comparisons could also be used to facilitate difficult 
counseling questions to improve a manager’s ability to discern between skill, 
characteristics, and knowledge as they relate to productivity (Lucia & Lepsinger, 1999). 
The validity of a comparison implies that the rate on the performance appraisal 
represent actual performance free of error and biases (Bernardin & Beatty, 1984). 
Absolute methods of comparison allow for a high level of rater error including leniency, 
severity, and central tendency bias (Landy & Farr, 1983; Cascio, 1989). A specific error 
associated with absolute comparison methods is the inflation of ratings or leniency 
(Bernardin & Beatty, 1984). Raters may intentionally rate all workers at high levels of 
performance since a worker is compared to an absolute standard. A performance 
comparison to an absolute standard does not guarantee differentiation between 
individuals on performance if managers are unwilling to make tough calls on worker 
performance or if the managers do not observe and recall ongoing individual performance 
(Longenecker, 1989; Grote, 2005). 
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Relative methods evaluate an individual’s performance by comparing it to another 
individual’s performance. Paired comparisons and rank order are the most popular 
relative methods (Bernardin & Beatty, 1984; Grote, 2005). Relative methods force 
differentiation of individuals’ performance since a comparison is required between two 
individuals. Since differentiation is considered critical to identify top performers this is 
an advantage over an absolute comparison (Grote, 2005). 
Comparing one individual to another is relatively easier to accomplish than an 
absolute comparison (Landy & Farr, 1983; Bernadin & Beatty, 1984). Accurately 
comparing each individual to each absolute measure can be very challenging and time 
consuming. Research has shown that relative comparisons are more accurate and more 
reliable (Landy & Farr, 1983).  
Incentives are an essential tool for management to motivate their workers and 
align behavior with goals (Simons, 2000). Relative rankings allow incentives to be 
incorporated in organizations even if output is hard to measure (Devaro, 2006). Relative 
methods provide management a mechanism to incentivize and increase productivity 
based on a comparison in contrast to the challenging task of determining individual 
output.  
Another advantage of relative comparisons is its ability to neutralize unobserved 
productivity shocks (Lazear, 1995; Green & Stokey, 1983). Relative methods neutralize 
unobserved shocks since the comparison does not focus on absolute performance but 
relative productivity. An individual’s relative production is unchanged despite the shock 
causing lower or higher levels of productivity (Lazear, 1995). If a relative comparison is 
used, the effect of the shock is the same on both individuals and the individual 
performing best will still be recognized (Lazear, 1995).  
Relative methods do have limitations. Relative comparisons produce ordinal data 
that do not express the differences between each rank (Bernardin & Beatty, 1984). It is 
possible for an individual ranked number two to be far more productive than the number 
three ranked individual but barely less productive than the individual ranked number one. 
Also, by the nature of a relative comparison there is no absolute information to determine 
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how well an individual has performed (Bernardin et al., 1984). When relative methods 
are used an individual does not need to possess any specific level of skill, knowledge, or 
characteristic since they are evaluated on relative performance to others.  
D. HOW IS RATING ACCURACY OF THE PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL 
IMPROVED? 
1. Rater Training 
Rater training is critical to improve the ability of the rater to conduct accurate 
performance appraisals (Latham & Wexley, 1994). Rater training serves two purposes: 1) 
It increases the manager’s knowledge of the performance instrument and procedures. 2) It 
increases the knowledge of biases that unknowingly affect the manager’s judgments. 
According to Latham and Wexley (1994), knowledge alone will not change raters’ 
behavior. There must also be practical applications with feedback to ensure change 
(Latham & Wexley, 1994). 
Training influences the process of performance appraisals (Longenecker, 1989). 
Some performance appraisals are inaccurate because a manager does not allow enough 
time to conduct a thorough analysis of individual performance or made little effort to 
notice performance over the period of evaluation (Grote, 2005). The performance 
appraisal process is an ongoing process that must be conducted frequently (Longenecker, 
1989). Managers must make efforts throughout the evaluation period to note performance 
in order to be able to base judgments on information other than memory (Longenecker, 
1989). Longenecker (1989) describes the appraisal process in five steps: 1) Communicate 
the worker’s job description, goals, and performance standards, 2) Observe worker’s 
actual performance and provide feedback on regular basis, 3) Store relevant performance 
data for future recalling, 4) Render judgment of worker performance in completing the 
appraisal instrument, and 5) Conduct an open and honest appraisal interview.  
Biases unknowingly affect the manager’s ability to make accurate judgments. The 
main biases associated with performance appraisals are halo, opportunity, recency, 
leniency (negative and positive), central tendency, restriction of range, and similar-to-me 
(Landy & Farr, 1983; Bernardin & Beatty, 1984; Latham & Wexley, 1994). Research has 
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shown how these biases if ignored will affect rating accuracy (Latham & Wexley, 1994). 
Rater training will not ensure the complete elimination of rater errors associated with 
biases but properly conducted rater training will cause a lasting improvement to 
performance appraisal rating accuracy (Latham & Wexley, 1994; Murphy, 2008). 
2. Rater Attitude 
An important issue for rating accuracy is the manager’s willingness to provide an 
accurate and honest appraisal (Longenecker & Ludwig, 1990). Longenecker, Liverpool, 
and Wilson (1988) showed that despite well-designed rating instruments and procedures, 
rating accuracy was not ensured if the rater was not willing to accurately rate individuals’ 
performances. Longenecker and Ludwig (1990) state several reasons why raters inflate or 
deflate ratings. Managers will manipulate ratings for a variety of reasons but they usually 
are based on a perceived best interest of their workers or themselves (Longenecker, 
1989). Figure 2 describes the relationship of rating behavior and rater motives. 
 
Figure 2.  Rater Motives and Manipulative Rating Behavior  
(after Longenecker & Ludwig, 1990). 
Longenecker and Ludwig (1990) found that many managers do not find anything 
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The consequence of intentional rating inaccuracies for short-term gain has long-
term effects that most managers do not consider (Grote, 2005; Longenecker & Ludwig, 
1990). The long-term effect of inaccurate ratings at the organization level can cause 
problems with incentives, morale, training, and promotion decisions (Longenecker, 
1989). For instance, the ability to use the performance appraisal to enhance productivity 
will be lost since results of the appraisal will be met with skepticism (Longenecker & 
Ludwig, 1990).  
The consequence for inaccurate ratings is also felt at the local or individual level. 
Performance appraisal results are likely discussed among workers. If inaccuracies are 
perceived, there will be increasing distrust (Grote, 2005). Longenecker (1989) shows how 
rating inaccuracies decrease trust, diminish a manager’s ability to reward high 
performers, increase workplace uncertainty, and create more performance problems than 
the performance appraisal solves. The performance appraisal process can only be 
effective if trust is maintained between the manager and the workers (Longenecker, 
Liverpool & Wilson, 1988).  
E. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
1. Cost - Benefits 
Labor costs continue to be the largest expense in many organizations (Saratoga 
Institute, 1994). As discussed earlier, performance appraisals can be conducted to collect 
information on individuals that will assist management in future financial decisions 
pertaining to promotions, retention efforts, performance incentives, and job fit (Bernardin 
& Beatty, 1984; Jovanovic, 1979; Rosen, 1992). If returns from human capital 
investments exceed costs then improved financial productivity should be the result of 
retaining the most productive individuals (Huselid, 1995). The financial performance of 
an organization is strongly tied to human capital management practices (Cascio, 1991; 
Flamholtz, 1985). Cascio (1991) states that financial returns for improvements made to 
the management of personnel are generally large. Huselid (1995) shows that 
organizations with high performance work practices, which include performance 
appraisals, show significant improvements on performance that also are financially 
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meaningful. Borman (1991) and Gerhart and Milkovich (1992) show how performance 
appraisals can increase firm profitability.  
2. Performance Metric 
Becker and Gerhart (1996) state that it is difficult to measure the influence of 
human capital on the bottom line of an organization. The financial costs of obtaining 
human capital are relatively easy to determine but the benefits are more difficult to 
quantify (Beck & Gerhart, 1996). Higgins (2014) states that to understand the financial 
benefits of human capital efforts analytics should be developed that numerically illustrate 
positive or negative changes to productivity. Higgins (2014) states that human capital 
metrics puts a number to an individual so that management can understand the value of 
that individual. An individual metric that is based on existing performance appraisal 
literature should give an organization the ability to develop policies that produce optimal 
results that are measureable. This in turn would reduce costs by allowing financial 
resources to be allocated more efficiently and effectively. 
F. SUMMARY 
The literature provides a structure by which the current performance appraisal 
systems of the Navy and Marine Corps can be evaluated. The literature is focused on 
incentive structures and performance appraisals: First, I looked at tournament theory and 
internal labor market concepts. Second, I laid out several purposes of the performance 
appraisal. Third, the foundational elements of performance appraisal structure and 
comparisons are explored. Fourth, I looked at means to improve rating accuracies. Lastly, 
I looked at the financial benefits of developing a performance metric that can assign a 
value of productivity to an individual and in turn provide management a tool for more 
effective and efficient use of finite financial resources. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This section describes the method for case selection, information collection, and 
information analysis. I establish criteria to evaluate each case and test my hypothesis. 
A. CASE SELECTION  
I choose two cases for this research. The cases are the published performance 
appraisal processes and rating instruments of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps 
(Department of the Navy, 2011; Department of the Navy, 2010). The two case studies 
were selected due to the similarities of each organization in structure, charter, and overall 
mission. Through the comparison and analysis of these cases, information is collected 
based on existing literature to determine how performance appraisals should be used to 
optimally signal Navy officer productivity. 
I did not consider the other three branches of the United States Armed Forces, 
foreign militaries, non-military government employment, or private sector organizations 
due to the scope of this research. 
B. CASE INFORMATION 
I collected information on both case studies from military and non-military 
sources via the Internet. Both branches of the military have a written policy for 
conducting performance appraisals that includes the rating instrument and procedures. 
The information collected fully supports this research allowing for a comparison of both 
performance appraisal structures to principles identified in the existing literature.  
C. ANALYSIS 
The Navy and Marine performance appraisal policies are evaluated using criteria 
established in existing literature. The criteria are extensive although they do not cover all 
issues associated with performance appraisals; this research focuses on those items for 
which there is agreement among researchers.  
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The Navy and Marines’ rating instruments and rating procedures are analyzed to 
determine the basis for which judgments and performance comparisons are made. 
Analysis is conducted to determine if and how the performance appraisal’s purpose is 




For the following analysis, the term performance appraisal structure (PAS) will 
refer to the rating instrument and procedural guidance for conducting performance 
appraisal. 
A. NAVY –PAS 
The current Navy officer PAS is documented in the Navy Bureau of Personnel 
Instruction (BUPERSINST) 1610.10C. The original 1610.10 instruction was published in 
August 1995 and has since gone through three revisions: A in September 2005, B in July 
2008, and C in April 2011. The current version has two interim changes (IC) that were 
published in August and October 2013.  
The rating instrument is NAVPERS 1610/2 and is called the Fitness Report & 
Counseling Record or FITREP for short. See Appendix A. The rating instrument contains 
three main sections that appraise performance. They are block 33 through 39-
Performance Traits, block 41-Comments on Performance, and block 42-Promotion 
Recommendations. Guidance for each section is in the instruction.  
Block 33 through 39–Performance Traits are comprised of seven traits:  
1) Professional Expertise 2) Command or Organizational Climate/ Equal Opportunity  
3) Military Bearing/Character 4) Teamwork 5) Mission Accomplishment and Initiative  
6) Leadership and 7) Tactical Performance. The definition of each trait is defined in the 
instruction. Each trait is arranged into a Behavior Anchored Rating Scale (BARS) and  
is rated on a point system. The points and their definitions are: 1.0-Below Standards,  
2.0-Progressing, 3.0-Meets Standards, 4.0-Above Standards, 5.0-Greatly Exceeds 
Standards. Behavioral descriptions are associated with the rates 1.0, 3.0, and 5.0. After 
appraising the performance traits, all seven trait grades are averaged to produce the 
“Member Trait Average.” This average is located in block 45-Signature of Reporting 
Senior (RS). The RS is typically the Commanding Officer and is the “rater” for all officer 
performance appraisals. Block 45 also contains the “Summary Group Average” which is 
the trait average of all individuals in the summary group being evaluated by the RS. A 
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summary group is the group of individuals of similar rank and promotion status who are 
being evaluated by the same RS.  
Block 41-Comments on Performance is a large block to describe the ratings 
assigned to performance traits. The instruction states that numerical rankings among 
peers are “authorized” and that all comments should be based on “verifiable facts.” The 
block should be used for general comments but stock comments should be avoided. 
Block 42-Promotion Recommendation is filled out by the RS. The options in 
descending order are: 1) Early Promote (EP), 2) Must Promote (MP), 3) Promotable (P), 
4) Progressing, 5) Significant Problems. Recommendations of EP, MP, and P are all 
recommendations for the individual to be promoted. Block 43-Summary is the number of 
promotion recommendations per summary group.  
The instruction restricts the distribution of promotion recommendations. They are 
required to be distributed as a percentage of the total number of individuals in the 
summary group and based on rank. In general, only 20 percent of the total number of 
individuals in the summary group may receive an EP. The number of MPs is regulated by 
a maximum combined percentage of EP and MP depending on rank. For O-3s there is no 
restriction for the number of MPs that can be assigned. Lastly, the highest 
recommendation an O-1 or O-2 can receive is P. See Appendix C for the full table.  
The instruction states that promotion recommendations should be consistent with 
performance trait grades and with the individual’s trait average. The RS may take into 
account the difficulty of the assignment and the individual’s likely future value to the 
Navy. EP and MP recommendations should not be given simply because quotas are 
available. An individual can go from a promotion recommendation of “Significant 
Problems” on one report to EP on the next report based on his or her performance and the 
RS’s recommendation. The instruction also provides restrictions on promotion 
recommendations based on the results of performance trait grades. A P recommendation 
cannot be assigned with two or more 2.0 performance trait grades or with any 1.0 
performance trait grade. A MP or EP recommendation may not be assigned with any 
performance trait assessed as 2.0.  
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B. MARINE CORPS–PAS 
The current Marine officer PAS is documented in the Marine Corps Order 
P1610.7F dated November 19, 2010. The Marine Corps refers to the policy, procedures, 
and standards which govern the performance appraisal administration as the performance 
evaluation system (PES). Its stated purpose is to support the selection, promotion, and 
retention of the most qualified individuals.  
The current Marine officer rating instrument is the NAVMC 10835 and is called 
the USMC Fitness Report (1610). See Appendix B. The rater is required to document his 
or her observations and assessment of performance as well as individual character. The 
appraisal instrument contains seven sections for the rater to record performance 
appraisals. The “rater” is called the Reporting Senior (RS) and is the next officer up the 
chain of command from the individual being evaluated. There is also another section for 
the Reviewing Officer (RO), the next officer up the chain of command from the RS, to 
make minimal appraisal inputs, ensure the RS is following established procedures, and to 
concur or reject the RS’s appraisal. 
 The seven sections used to evaluate performance can be split up into three sub-
sections. They are: 1) Section A block 7–Promotion Recommendation 2) Sections D 
thorough H–Performance Anchored Rating Scales (PARS) 3) Section K–Reviewing 
Officer Comments.  
The promotion recommendation block gives the RS four options. They are:  
1) Yes 2) No 3) N/A 4) Leave it blank. Yes and No are the assigned recommendations of 
the RS when the individual is up for promotions on normal timelines. Leaving the 
promotion recommendation blank allows the RS to recommend a promotion ahead of a 
normal timeline. All recommendations are based on an individual’s “exhibited 
performance” and their capability or lack of capability to perform at the next level. 
Billet accomplishment is a written narrative on what the individual has 
accomplished. This section is void of all references to the quality of work performed and 
is simply a report on what was accomplished during the time period of the appraisal.  
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Section D through G are 13 behavioral traits that account for 81 percent of the 
total performance comparisons contained in the rating instrument. The traits are broken 
down into four sections: 1) Section D-Mission Accomplishment: Performance and 
Proficiency 2) Section E–Individual Character: Courage, Effectiveness under stress, 
Initiative 3) Section F–Leadership: Leading Subordinates, Developing Subordinates, 
Setting the Example, Ensuring Well-Being of Subordinates, Communication Skills 
4) Section G–Intellect and Wisdom: Professional Military Education (PME), Decision 
Making Ability, Judgment. Section H evaluates the fulfillment of evaluation 
responsibilities. Sections D through H are behavior anchored rating scales (BARS) that 
the Marines call performance anchored rating scales (PARS). The scale is similar to a 
BARS in that each trait is well defined in the instruction and anchored by letters that are 
associated with a point value. The ratings and associated point values are A=1.0, B=2.0, 
C=3.0, D=4.0, E=5.0, F=6.0, and H is unobserved with no point value assigned. Ratings 
of 2.0(B) through 4.0(D) represent favorable ratings. The measurements of 5.0(E) and 
6.0(G) are reserved for the rare individuals who demonstrate sustained exceptional 
performance.  
The average is calculated from all 13 observable trait grades but is not displayed 
on the appraisal instrument. Individuals can find an approximation of their relative 
performance called a Relative Value (RV) by referencing another document called the 
Master Brief Sheet (MBS). See Appendix D. The RV is computed based on their 
performance trait mean relative to the other individuals in group being evaluated. The RV 
depicts trait grades in a relative format from 80 being the lowest to 100 being the highest 
rating for all reports by an RS for that period. 
Section K-Reviewing Officer Comments also contains performance appraisal 
data. This section allows the RO the next officer up the chain of command from the RS, 
to make an assessment of the individual’s performance compared to the performance of 
others. This assessment is a relative comparison of the individual’s performance to all 
Marines the RO has observed past and present. The options for ratings in descending 
orders are the following: 1) The Eminently Qualified Marine 2) One of the Few 
Exceptionally Qualified Marines 3) One of the many Highly Qualified Professionals Who 
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Form the Majority of This Grade 4) A Qualified Marine 5) Unsatisfactory. There are no 
grades associated with each selection. This section also allows for the RO to comment on 
their comparative assessment marks and the individual’s potential.  
C. CASE STUDY 
Navy and Marine PAS are evaluated based on the existing literature.. A word and 
topic search was conducted to determine the amount of emphasis and attention each PAS 
gave to topics from incentive and performance appraisal literature. The words and topics 
are analyzed to determine their context in the section of the PAS where they are located. 
Topics and emphasis are analyzed to determine if there is message alignment or 
contradictions throughout the PAS. All chapters, enclosures, and appendixes of the Navy 
and Marine PAS were searched. 
Overall themes and specific words related to each topic are analyzed based on the 
quantity of words, percentages of each PAS, and degrees of differentiation where 
appropriate. Results are recorded in Table 1. A detailed explanation of the analysis and 
table follow. For a record of the words search for each topic see Appendix E. 
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Table 1.   Case Study Navy and Marine Performance Appraisal Systems 
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Performance Traits Yes Yes
Promotion Recommendation-
Forced Distribution No / 
Rankings Yes†† /
Comparative Assessment / Yes
Relative Value / Yes
 
† There are up to 14 degrees of differentiation if the rater uses all 15 performance trait averages without duplication. 
‡ The Comparative Assessment allows seven options to rate an individual. There are up to n-1 degrees of 
differentiation assuming a rater uses all seven rates without duplication. 
* Percentages are based on an individual performing at the “standards” or higher. 
** Three degrees of differentiation are only required for O-4 through O-6, 2 degrees for O-3, and none for O-1 and O-2 
since P is the only authorized promotion recommendation. 
†† There is one relative comparison if the SR conducts rankings of all individuals in the group being evaluated. 
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D. SUBJECTIVE COMPARISON BASIS 
1. Absolute  
The Navy and Marine PASs rely mostly on absolute comparisons for the basis of 
evaluating individual performance. Both rely on performance trait scales that define 
individual behaviors and then derive other signals of productivity based on the 
performance traits average. 
If rankings are conducted, the Navy makes seven absolute comparisons and one 
relative comparison. The Marines make 13 absolute comparisons and one relative 
comparison. The result is 87.5 percent of the Navy and 92.8 percent of the Marines use 
absolute comparisons for evaluating performance.  
The Navy uses a trait average as a basis for a promotion recommendation and to 
compare an individual’s trait average to a summary group trait average. The Marines use 
performance trait averages to calculate an individual’s RV. The core of both performance 
appraisals are the evaluation of performance traits. 
2. Relative 
The Navy authorizes one relative comparison by ranking the individuals in a 
summary group. The Marines require one relative comparison, the “Comparative 
Assessment.” The Navy is comparing individual’s performance only in the current group 
being evaluated. The Marines compare the performance of an individual with all past, 
present, and future individuals at the same rank that the RO observes.  
Since both the Navy and Marines rely heavily on the absolute method of 
comparisons neither approach maximizes differentiation of performance. Both PASs 
allow for rater leniency and other rater errors associated with absolute comparisons. The 
Marines have a relative comparison that is required in contrast to the Navy where RSs 





The Navy PAS emphasizes “accuracy” 11 times or with 0.20 percent of the 5518 
total words used. There is one sentence in the introduction paragraph and one in Section 
18.6-Counseling Objectives that uses the word “accurate” as one of several adjectives to 
describe the performance assessment. There are no quotes from Navy leadership 
emphasizing the importance of the integrity of the appraisal process or producing 
accurate ratings. 
The Marine PAS emphasizes “accuracy” 139 times or with 2.17 percent of the 
6392 total words used by the Marine PAS. Accuracy is mentioned on 45 different pages 
in 13 sections including comments from the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The 
Commandant is quoted saying, “The complete fitness report is the most important 
information component in manpower management.” He states, “…the completion of this 
report is one of an officer’s most critical responsibilities.” The Commandant goes on to 
say inflated markings only serve to dilute the actual value of each report. Statements are 
made about the “scrupulous maintenance” of the appraisal structure. Chapter 1 of the 
instruction states that accuracy is one of the fundamental concepts of the evaluation 
system. Also, Section 1003-Objectives of the System is dedicated to the accuracy and 
importance of the performance appraisal process.  
The Marine instruction has a separate section on preventing rating inflation that 
states the PAS is designed to reduce rating inflation. The Marine PAS attempts to do this 
in four ways: 1) Recognizes the tendency for raters to over-inflate ratings. 2) Requires 
raters to justify trait ratings that are marked at the upper extremes on the rating scale.  
3) Appraisals are reviewed by the RO to ensure RS accuracy and adherence to guidance. 
4) Each rater is appraised on their ability to evaluate the duties of their subordinates in 
Section H during their own performance appraisal. This puts the rater into a risk adverse 
position vice risk neutral since their ability and willingness to adhere to the performance 
appraisal guidance will affect their own performance appraisal. This structure arguably 
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improves rating accuracy as each rater will not be willing to inflate or deflate a 
performance appraisal of an individual that he or she cannot support with evidence.  
The Marines’ emphasis on rating accuracy is relatively clear to the user due to 
instructional guidance, dedicated sections on the importance of accuracy, and the Marine 
Commandant’s comments reiterating the importance. The three elements are aligned 
allowing for clear guidance to Marines using the instruction and rating instrument. In 
contrast, the Navy PAS has less mention of rating accuracy giving a reader the option to 
assume that it may not be a problem or not important. 
2. Rater Attitude 
The Marine PAS emphasizes issues pertaining to the rater attitude 127 times or 
1.99 percent of the 6392 total words. Section 1005- Key Concepts states that the 
performance appraisal is not a lever to exert influence on the individual being evaluated 
or a disciplinary tool. There is additional guidance in multiple sections that the purpose of 
the performance appraisal is to make future manpower decisions.  
In contrast, the Navy PAS emphasizes issues pertaining to the attitude the rater 
should have 12 times or 0.22 percent of the 5518 total words. The Navy PAS provides no 
direct guidance on how a rater’s attitude influences rating accuracy. The introduction in 
the instruction states the use of the rating instrument for promotions, training, and other 
managerial decisions but provides no restrictions on the rater to use performance 
appraisals for self-serving and short-term motivational purposes.   
The Navy’s lack of restrictions, accountability, and guidance would lead to 
inaccuracies and performance appraisals not based on merit. The Marines clearly 
recognize the importance of restricting raters from using the performance appraisal for 
ulterior purposes. They accomplish this by addressing the issue in the instruction and 
through accountability by the RO. 
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3. Rater Training 
The Navy PAS does not address a training requirement for raters or its importance 
for producing accurate ratings. There is also no emphasis on the importance of informing 
all officers on how the performance appraisal system will influence career opportunities. 
The Marine PAS emphasizes training in the PAS eight times or with  
0.125 percent of the 6392 total words used in the Marine PAS. Chapter 1 of the 
instruction states that for the achievement of the PAS’s fundamental concepts all 
participants must have knowledge of the system. Also, the Senior Marine Representative 
is required to ensure all individuals are educated on the PAS process. 
Unlike the Navy, the Marines address the importance of knowing the PAS and 
place a mechanism of training in place to continue to instruct and communicate its 
purpose and importance. 
4. Fairness 
The Navy PAS emphasizes fairness 17 times or with 0.31 percent of the  
5518 total words. Preferential treatment is not addressed in the appraisal instruction but 
the rating instrument is constructed in a way that does not discriminate on variables not 
merit based. The Navy PAS is non-discriminatory in that the rating instrument focuses on 
behavior or traits that would apply to all groups of individuals.  
The Marine PAS emphasizes fairness 19 times or with 0.30 percent of the PAS’s 
6392 total words. Section 1005-Key Concepts provide guidance to the importance of fair 
but also thorough performance evaluations. This section also addresses unfair 
involvement from the RO in an effort to ensure performance appraisals are fair and 
accurate from the RS. Lastly, the Marine PAS is non-discriminatory in that the rating 
instrument focuses on behavior and traits that would apply to all groups of individuals. 
F. DIFFERENTIATION OF TALENT 
Differentiation of talent is the capability of the PAS to record variance in the 
performance grades of individuals. The analysis focuses on performance trait grades, 
performance comments, promotion recommendations, rankings, and comparative 
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assessment. The first three are common to both to the Navy and Marine PAS. Rankings 
are used in the Navy PAS and comparative assessment in the Marine PAS.  
1. Performance Traits 
The Navy and the Marines both use performance traits to differentiate talent. Both 
systems are based on absolute comparisons of behavior to a defined standard. 
Differentiation between these scales is a function of the number of performance traits 
appraised and the number of grade options for each trait.  
The Navy appraises seven performance traits and the Marines appraise 13 traits. 
The increased number of performance traits allows the Marines performance appraisal to 
differentiate talent on six additional traits - 85 percent more than the Navy. The Navy’s 
seven traits are graded on a scale of 1.0 to 5.0. This allows for 29 different performance 
trait averages or means between 1.0 and 5.0. For example an individual could receive 
seven 1.0 grades, seven 5.0 grades or a combination of seven 1.0 through 5.0 grades.  
The range of averages would be; 1.00, 1.14, 1.29, 1.43, …. 4.57, 4.71, 4.86, 5.00. There 
is a value of 0.1429 between each possible average. The Marines’ 13 traits are graded on 
a scale of 1.0 to 7.0. This allows for 79 different performance trait averages between  
1.0 and 7.0. The range of averages would be; 1.00, 1.08. 1.15, 1.23, … 6.77, 6.85, 6.92, 
7.00. There is a value of 0.0769 between each possible average. 
The Marines have the option of 50 more trait means or 2.72 times the Navy 
performance trait scale to allow for the differentiation of talent. This comparison does not 
take into consideration other differences of the two PASs. To provide additional insight 
into the difference between the two scales, they are compared based on the definitions of 
the grading scales and rater guidance in each instruction. 
The Navy rating instrument and instruction define a performance that “Meets 
Standards” with a trait grade of 3.0. This allows for three options, 3.0, 4.0, or 5.0, to 
appraise and individual performing at or above the “standards” level for each trait. These 
three options for all seven traits allow for 15 possible trait averages to differentiate talent.  
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For the Marines the only grade that is not meeting behavioral standards is 1.0 (A). 
This allows for six options per trait to appraise an individual who is performing at or 
above the “standards” level compared to the Navy’s three options. These six options for 
all 13 traits allow for 66 performance trait means to differentiate talent. The Marine 
instruction states that a solid performer with no deficiencies has earned a commendable 
2.0(B) or 3.0(C). The instructional guidance is aligned with the rating instrument 
grounding grades for “standards” performance at 2.0(B).  
After adjusting the performance trait ranges based on a common definition 
between the Navy and Marine PAS the grade definitions at the “standard” level or above 
there is less opportunity for the Navy to differentiate talent then when ignoring 
definitions. If the majority of individuals perform at the average or “standards” level 
there is less opportunity to differentiate talent than the scale 1.0 to 5.0 would initially 
indicate. When comparing the scales of both the Navy and Marines’ rating instruments 
based on a common definitions the Marines allow 66 trait averages compared to the 
Navy’s 15. This allows the Marines 4.40 more times the options to differentiation talent 
than the Navy. 
The Marines are evaluating 13 traits vice the Navy’s seven which may cause more 
grade options simply because there are more traits. To adjust for this difference assume 
that both the Navy and the Marines only evaluate seven traits. In this case, the Navy 
would have 15 possible trait averages compared to the new Marine possibility of 36 trait 
averages for individuals performing at or above the “standards.” That is still 2.40 times 
more differentiation than the Navy. 
A Navy SR who is appraising a group of individuals larger than 15 will have at 
least two individuals with the same trait average assuming that the rater tries to maximize 
the number of different trait averages given. This results in a max degree of 
differentiation of 14, or n -1 where n ≤ 15. With an N > 15 the result remains a maximum 
of 14 degrees of differentiation as some individuals will have the same trait average.  
The Marine performance trait average results in a max degree of differentiation of 
n -1 for n ≤ 66. This assumes that all individuals have a different trait average. The 
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instruction states that a rater should evaluate an individual on his or her traits and 
reference the individual’s performance trait average post evaluation only to minimize and 
adjust for rating inflation if appropriate.  
Note that each performance trait scale is intentionally structured to provide 
differentiation for the actual populations of Navy and Marine officers. If the Navy has 
more below “standards” performing officers than the Marines then the Navy structure is 
doing a good job of capturing the variation within their own ranks. Additionally, based on 
the Marine structure there are no below “standards” Marine officers, only varying 
degrees of good ones or “adverse” at the lower extreme.  
This differentiation is not forced by the rating instrument or required by the 
instruction. Both systems use absolute comparisons with the possibility of two or more 
individuals receiving the same grade. The Marine performance trait scales provide the 
rater on average 4.40 times more options for differentiation of talent. Despite this Marine 
advantage both PASs could provide additional differentiation through relative 
comparisons. 
2. Performance Comments 
Performance Comments for both PASs are to provide justification for 
performance trait grades. Comments are not designed to provide differentiation of talent 
according to the instructions. Both rating instruments provide sections for comments and 
each instruction discusses comment guidance. The Marine rating instrument allows for 
this throughout the Performance Trait section and the Navy rating instrument dedicates a 
separate section.  
The Navy instruction requires comments for low trait grades. Grades of 1.0, three 
2.0, or below 3.0 for Command Climate or Character require comment. For the Marines 
only the high grades require justification. Specifically, trait grades of 6.0(F) and 7.0(G) 
require comment.  
The requirement to provide justification for high or low ratings may have negative 
incentives on the rater accuracy (Grote, 2005). According to Grote (2005) raters will 
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avoid assigning grades that require extra time or effort on their part. The Navy 
requirement to comment on lower grades incentivizes the rater to inflate grades. The 
Marines requirement to comment on higher grades incentivizes the rater to deflate grades. 
The impact of both inflating and deflating is greatest on the Navy since the scale is more 
limited with less performance trait average options for differentiation. The Marines 
attempt to counter the adverse incentive through training and instructional guidance on 
the importance of accurate ratings. 
The Marines also have an additional section for the RO to make comments. These 
comments provide additional justification and add a degree of differentiation since 
comments could either agree or disagree with the RS’s appraisal.  
Both the Navy and Marine comments have no or little differentiation value. That 
is, they provided justification for ratings but there is no mechanism to ensure accuracy or 
differentiation of comments. Additionally, the requirement for comments may actually 
restrict variance of ratings if a rater is looking to complete the performance appraisal as 
quickly as possible. Requirements to justify performance trait grades require information 
that may take time to collect as well as time to write the justification. This additional 
effort required to justify a grade may incentivize the rater to assign a less extreme rating 
if time or individual performance information is limited. 
3. Promotion Recommendations 
The Marine promotion recommendation of “yes” or “no” is designed to 
differentiate between an individual who is not meeting the “standards” and an individual 
who is performing at or above the “standards.” Two individuals performing above the 
standards will receive the same recommendation and no differentiation between their 
performances will be provided.  
The Navy promotion recommendation is a forced distribution structure with 
specific percentages assigned for each recommendation. See Appendix C. The promotion 
recommendation is designed to be “consistent” with the performance trait averages. For 
example, the individual with the highest performance trait average would have the 
highest performance recommendation. Based on the structure of the promotion 
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recommendations there is only differentiation between individuals with different 
promotion recommendations. Two individuals with EP recommendations will have no 
differentiation. For some ranks like O-3 the distribution of promotion recommendations 
is left to the discretion of the RS. The instruction limits the number of EPs but allows for 
unlimited MP. There is no requirement or guidance in the instruction to manage this 
distribution a specific way. Since individuals that receive the same promotion 
recommendation are not differentiated among themselves the degree of differentiation is 
dependent on the discretion of the RS using the full range of promotion recommendations 
available.  
The Marine’s degree of differentiation for the promotion recommendation cannot 
be greater than one since the recommendation options are either “yes” or “no.” If one 
Marine is given a “yes” recommendation and another is given a “no” recommendation 
then there are two distinct grades with one degree of difference between the two 
individuals. If it is assumed that most individuals in a group will be recommended for 
promotion then the average degree of differentiation is reduced since all in the group will 
have the same promotion recommendation. For example, if there are 20 individuals in a 
group and one is not recommended for promotion then the 19 are differentiated from the 
one but are not differentiated from the other individuals in the group of 19.  
The Navy’s structure differentiates in five groups. The groups recommending for 
promotion are: 1) Early Promote (EP) 2) Must Promote (MP) 3) Promotable (P). The 
groups not recommending for promotion are: 1) Significant Problems 2) Progressing. The 
degree of differentiation of performance recommendations depends on the discretion of 
the RS. If the RS uses promotion recommendations of EPs and MPs for the entire group 
there will be less differentiation than if the RS recommendations EPs, MPs and Ps. For 
this reason, the Navy’s degrees of differentiation can vary. Assuming that the majority of 
individuals will be recommended for promotion there is a max of three but as little as two 
degrees of differentiation for O-3s, and no degree of differentiation for O-1 and O-2s 
since P is the only authorized promotion recommendation for those ranks. 
The Navy promotion recommendation provides more differentiation than the 
Marines. The Marines use their recommendation as simply a requirement to proceed 
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while the Navy incorporates a forced distribution allowing for greater differentiation. 
However, if the purpose of a promotion recommendation is to provide differentiation 
from those that should be considered for promotion and those that are not capable to 
move up then the only requirement is to have one degree of differentiation. If this is the 
case both the Navy and the Marine promotion recommendations would provide necessary 
promotion information despite the Navy structure being more complicated to interpret.  
4. Rankings 
The Navy authorizes but does not require ranking in the “Comments on 
Performance” section. The Navy PAS does not provide any guidance or 
recommendations for conducting rankings. Rankings force differentiation of talent. 
Differentiation is not dependent on the procedures or the discretion of the rater. If a rater 
is evaluating the performance of 20 individuals there would be 19 degrees of 
differentiation. Degrees of differentiation would equal n-1, where n is the number of 
individuals being evaluated and ranked. 
Differentiation in the Navy is not forced since rankings are left to the discretion of 
the RS. If rankings are conducted for a portion of the group, for example the top third or 
the bottom third, then the degree of differentiation will be reduced. The degree of 
differentiation would then be calculated as n, where n is the number the RS decides to 
rank. To illustrate if three individuals are ranked from a group of ten, 1 of 10, 2 of 10,  
3 of 10, then the performance of the remaining seven will not be differentiated. This 
ranking would result is three degrees of differentiation which is far less than possible 
with a full ranking. No ranking guidance or requirements are given in the Navy 
instruction so the potential degree of differentiation could be as little as zero if rankings 
were not conducted. 
5. Comparative Assessment 
The Marines rating instrument does not rank individuals but it does conduct a 
different type of relative comparison. In the “Reviewing Officer Comments” section, 
there is a space for comparing the individual’s performance to the performance of the 
other individuals that the RO has observed over his or her career. There are seven 
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different levels a RO can assign to an individual that is meeting or exceeding the 
standards. This allows for a maximum degree of differentiation of n-1 when n ≤ 7 for the 
current group of individuals being evaluated. For differentiation to be maximized, the RO 
must mark each individual at a different level which is unlikely since most groups of 
individuals would be normally distributed around the mean. There is no restriction in the 
rating instrument for the RO assigning the same grade to every individual. The degree of 
differentiation would be zero if all individuals were marked at the same level. 
G. LEARNING 
The rating instrument and performance procedures provide a mechanism that 
allows the Navy and Marines to learn about the productivity and future potential of an 
individual. Neither, the Navy or Marine PASs makes explicit statements or references to 
learning about an individual’s productivity but the rating instrument and its outputs 
computed from the comparisons allow for learning in broad and specific areas. Learning 
in both these cases occurs in two forms, specific and general. Specific learning is 
accomplished through the performance traits and general learning of individual 
productivity is accomplished through rankings and promotion recommendations.  
The Navy PAS facilitates specific learning for seven performance traits. The 
Marine PAS collects information on 13 traits. This allows the Marines to collect specific 
information on 85 percent more types of behavior than the Navy. An example of this 
increased data collection is seen for the performance trait “Leadership.” Both rating 
instruments measure this trait but the Marines define it more specifically. They divide the 
trait into five sub-traits which allow for five times the information to be collected. 
The Navy and Marines’ relative comparisons allow for general learning. The 
Navy’s rankings in the “Comments on Performance” and the Marines’ “Comparative 
Assessment” demonstrate individual productivity levels. Both relative performance 
comparisons allow for learning on an individual’s relative productivity compared to 
others. 
The validity of what is learned is a function of the accuracy of the performance 
appraisal’s rating and the degree of differentiation of talent. If the rater did not accurately 
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appraise an individual’s performance then what is learned about an individual’s 
productivity will be incorrect or at least less accurate. If the performance appraisal did 
not differentiate an individual’s performance then avoidable noise prevents a clearer 
productivity signal. Based on the Marines’ emphasis on accuracy and differentiation of 
talent the potential validity of what is learned by the Marines is greater than that of the 
Navy. 
H. COMMUNICATION OF EXPECTED BEHAVIOR 
The Navy defines expected behaviors in the rating instrument as part of the 
performance trait scales. There are no expanding definitions or discussions on 
performance trait behaviors in the performance appraisal instruction.  
The Marines define expected behaviors in both the performance appraisal 
instruction and the rating instrument. The instruction provides definitions and discussions 
for each performance trait and sub-trait. For example, Section D is title “Mission 
Accomplishment” and is broken down into two sub categories of “Performance” and 
“Proficiency.” The instruction first defines “Mission Accomplishment” and then explains 
its importance. Following this both sub traits, “Performance” and “Proficiency” are 
defined, three levels of behavior are described, and then both sub-traits are further 
explained in separate sections. The sub-trait definition and the three descriptions of 
different levels of behavior are duplicated on the rating instrument for scaling the 
performance trait. 
As discussed earlier the Navy appraises performance on a 1.0 though a 5.0 scale 
with 3.0 through 5.0 representing marks for an individual performing at the “Meets 
Standards” level or above. The Navy provides three descriptions of behavior for each of 
the seven performance traits. Descriptions are provided for 1.0, 3.0, and 5.0 grades. This 
allows for two useful descriptions per trait or 14 total descriptions to communicate 
expected behavior of individuals performing at or above the “standards.” 
The Marines provide three descriptions of behaviors for each of the  
13 performance traits. Descriptions are provided for 2.0(B), 4.0(D), 6.0(F) grades.  
All three behavior descriptions apply to an individual who is performing at or  
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above the “standards” level. This results in 39 descriptions of behaviors spread over  
13 performance traits. 
The Navy uses an average of 55 words per trait to define and describe the two 
levels of performance at or above the “standards” level. The Marines use 94 words to 
define the performance trait, discuss its importance, and describe three levels of 
performance at or above the same level. The Navy’s total word count for both the 
performance instruction and rating instrument is 603 words or 10.9 percent of the total 
words in the PAS. The Marines use 1221 words or 19.1 percent of the total words in the 
PAS. If you adjust the Navy and Marine word count for descriptions of behaviors for 
individuals performing at or above the “standards” level then the Navy uses 387 words at 
7.0 percent compared to the Marines 1221 words at 19.1 percent. 
The level of communication concerning expected behavior of the Marine PAS is 
2.73 times higher than the Navy PAS. All Marine performance traits are defined and their 
importance is discussed in the instruction. This allows all Marines to understand the level 
of behavior that is expected and why it is important to the future of the Marine Corps. 
I. ENABLE FEEDBACK 
Both the Navy and Marines’ rating instruments provide information to enable 
feedback that can inform and motivate the individual being evaluated. Feedback could be 
divided into two categories similar to absolute and relative comparisons of performance. 
The first provides information on what an individual is doing well or needs improving 
and the second provides information on how the individual compares to others in his or 
her summary group. Both the Navy and Marine PASs answer an individual’s question 
with regard to both categories. 
The Navy and Marine rating instrument answers the question, “What can I do 
better?” through the performance trait grades. Again, the Marines provide feedback on  
13 performance traits compared to the Navy’s feedback on seven. The advantages of the 
Marines performance trait scale noted earlier also applies here. An individual who is 
performing at or above the “standards” could receive six different grades per trait. Over 
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time this allows an individual to be recognized for improvement and receive feedback 
with a corresponding trait grade.  
For the Navy information on the question, “How am I doing compared to others?” 
is provided in rankings if conducted, “Promotion Recommendation,” and the “Summary 
Group Average.” For the Marines the information is contained in the “Comparative 
Assessment” and RV. If an individual is ranked they are given feedback on how they are 
performing in comparison to others in the group. If the RS does not rank an individual 
then feedback on relative performance can be received from “Promotion 
Recommendations.” If an individual receives an EP they can reference the total number 
of EPs, MPs, and Ps given and determine a relative standing with less clarity than 
rankings. “Promotion Recommendations” provide less clarity since the rating instrument 
does not differentiation between the top and bottom EP, MP, or P. Lastly, an individual’s 
performance trait average can be compared to the summary group average. An individual 
can note if his or her trait average is above or below the group average but receives little 
other feedback on how they compare to others. Without knowing the standard deviation 
of the group the individual cannot discern a clear relative position compared to the others. 
A Marine officer receives feedback to the question “How am I doing compared to 
others?” from the “Comparative Assessment” and the RV produced from the 
performance trait average. Both sections are required to be completed for every 
performance appraisal. The “Comparative Assessment” tells an individual how they are 
doing in comparison to others of the same rank. The RV provides feedback on how an 
individual’s performance trait average relates to other individuals in the group at the time 
of receiving the appraisal as well as cumulatively over time. The RV is not a relative 
comparison but does provide feedback on the relative position of the individual’s 
performance trait average.  
The Navy and Marine PAS answer both categories of questions but limit 
information is provided for relative performance related to others. The Marines provide 
superior relative information with the RV unless the Navy SR conducts rankings for all 
individuals in the summary group.  
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J. ACCOUNTABILITY  
Performance trait grades, rankings, and promotion recommendations allow for 
accountability in the Navy’s PAS. Performance trait grades provide accountability on 
seven broad traits. The SR’s ability and willingness to conduct accurate appraisals is 
critical for an individual to be accountable for his or her behaviors.  
The promotion recommendation forced distribution structure limits the ability of 
the rater to recognize high performers if the rater is evaluating a number of top 
performers that exceeds the allowed number of EP promotion recommendations. A rater 
is not required to assign EP promotion recommendations but they are limited in number if 
they do. Human performance is typically distributed normally with the majority of 
individuals performing around the means. The Navy’s forced distribution percentages is 
skewed left and does not allow proper alignment with a normal distribution of human 
performances.  
If rankings are conducted then individuals are accountable for their performance 
relative to other’s performance. Relative comparisons such as rankings do not provide 
accountability for individuals who have improved their absolute productivity level.  
The Marines PAS use performance trait grades, “Comparative Assessment” 
section, and the RV derived from an individual’s trait average to provide accountable. 
These three sections do not have limits on the distribution of grades. The performance 
traits provide accountability for improving their productivity as it pertains to 13 traits. 
Each trait scale provides six grade options to recognize changes in behavior for an 
individual performing at or above the standards. 
The “Comparative Assessment” is a relative comparison that provides 
accountability in relation to others. It is possible that an individual sees an improvement 
in his or her performance trait average but does not improve on the comparative 
assessment. The “Comparative Assessment” does not provide accountability for 
performance improvements unless those improvements change an individual’s relative 
position. 
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The RV allows an individual to see how his or her absolute performance 
compares to others. Unlike the “Comparative Assessment” small improvements to 
relative position will be recognized.  
The Marines emphasis on accuracy and accountability and their increased options 
for performance trait grades allow for individuals to receive acknowledgement for their 
performance even if only small improvements are made. They Navy PAS provides less 
options for accountability. If rankings are conducted there is good accountability for 
relative performance but small absolute individual improvements may not be notice on 
the rating instrument due to a lack of options for trait averages.  
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V. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION 
A. RECOMMENDATION 
The Navy is structured as an internal labor market with “tournament” style 
incentives. There are a set number of job opportunities at each level and promotion to 
those positions are based on relative performance. This incentive structure is not 
concerned with determining overall productivity but promoting the most productive 
individual relative to others. 
The Navy’s PAS needs to be able to identify and differentiate the performance of 
individuals to ensure that the most productive individuals are being promoted. For the 
Navy to optimally signal an officer’s productivity the author recommends three actions 
based on research and the results of comparing the Navy and Marine PAS.  
1. Emphasize Rating Accuracy 
The Navy PAS puts very little emphasis on the rater’s attitude and its importance 
for the accuracy of ratings. Rating accuracy is fundamental to be able to optimally signal 
a Navy officer’s productivity. The lack of emphasis in the Navy instruction allows for a 
misalignment between the RS’s behavior and Navy manpower strategy. To improve 
accuracy the following steps should be taken: 1) Navy leadership should explicitly 
address the importance of the accuracy and integrity of the performance appraisal system. 
2) Change the performance rating instruction to include three additional sections on 
accuracy, grade inflation, and training requirements for RSs. 3) Change the instruction to 
require an officer one level up the chain of command from the RS to monitor for grade 
inflation and compliance with the letter and spirit of the instruction. 4) External to the 
PAS ensure all negative incentives are removed that would incentivize inaccurate 
appraisals. A decline in an individual’s relative ranking should not be interpreted as a 
decline in performance. Performances naturally vary and relative comparisons should be 
allowed to represent these variations. For example, if an Operational Screen Board or 
Statutory Promotion Board penalizes an individual for a declining relative performance 
while his or her absolute performance is rising, this will incentivize RSs to inflate relative 
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performance. An individual’s relative performance should have the freedom to be at the 
top one period and at the bottom the next. Any other expectations on relative 
performance will have negative effects on rating accuracy. Raters will be focused on 
smoothing grades vice simply appraising performance.  
2. Integrate Relative Comparison 
Relative comparisons clearly align the Navy’s current incentive structure and 
tournament theory. Rankings should be required and conducted on every individual for 
every appraisal cycle. Rankings are simple and easy to conduct and provide significant 
improvements over performance traits to differentiate talent. Accuracy excluded, 
differentiation of talent is the most critical element of the PAS to optimally signal a Navy 
officer’s productivity. A separate section should exist for rankings instead of being 
included in the “Comments on Performance” section. Performance traits should not be 
removed as they provide a baseline for individual behavior and a means for leadership to 
communicate expectations and give feedback.  
Individuals should be ranked based on their behaviors and results of their 
behaviors. If individuals are ranked by looking at performance trait averages the rankings 
are not a relative comparison but the relative position of an absolute comparison. The 
Marine PAS instructs raters to first make comparisons based on how well an individual 
performed based on the written standards before looking at the distribution of rater 
grades. This concept is the optimal approach to ensure rating accuracy. One comparison 
should not influence another and grades based on performance should not be inflated or 
deflated for any means.  
3. Cumulative Productivity Metric 
 A cumulative productivity metric (CPM) that accounts for organizational learning 
and individual sustained productivity should be established. Since rankings do not 
account for the differences between the performances of individuals they must be 
adjusted to align with a normal distribution of human performance. Individual 
performance will have less variance around the mean and greater variance toward the 
extremes. Guilford (1954) explains how to do this. The number of individuals being 
  43
ranked will equal the number of objects occupying the space under a normal distribution 
curve. For this example μ = 50 and σ = 20. A standard deviation of 20 is selected to allow 
2.5 standard deviations or 98.86 percent of all values to be approximately located 
between 0 and 100. Each object under the normal distribution curve takes up the  
same amount of space. For a ranking of one through 10 each object takes up 100/10 or  
10 percent. We find the centile position, P for each object by performing the calculation, 
 0.5 100RiP
n
  where Ri = rank value and n = number of things ranked. From the 
normal distribution tables we can find z values that represent standard deviations from 
the mean for each value of P. Using the normal distribution curve mentioned above we 
can calculate the normalized values of the ranking. See Table 2. 
Table 2.   Calculation of Normalized Score for Ranks 1–10 
Rank(ri) 
Rank 
Value(Ri) Centile(P) z score Normalized(N) 
 n-ri+1 (Ri-0.5)/n  µ+(σ*z score) 
1 10 95.0 1.64 82.9 
2 9 85.0 1.04 70.7 
3 8 75.0 0.67 63.5 
4 7 65.0 0.39 57.7 
5 6 55.0 0.13 52.5 
6 5 45.0 -0.13 47.5 
7 4 35.0 -0.39 42.3 
8 3 25.0 -0.67 36.5 
9 2 15.0 -1.04 29.3 
10 1 5.0 -1.64 17.1 
 
N is now the normalized value of the centile position P of each ranking (Figure 3). 
An individual ranked first in the above example is 1.64 standard deviations above the 
mean for an N value of 82.9. This value represents the individuals’ productivity relative 




Figure 3.  Normal Distribution of Centile (P) 
When deriving a cumulative productivity metric the time of observation for each 
value of N is important. The value of N is based on the observation of the individual’s 
performance for a specific period of time. The longer an individual is observed the more 
accurate the performance appraisal would be from the RS. See Table 3. CPM signals the 
average officer productivity over multiple observation periods. 
Table 3.   Cumulative Productivity Metric (CPM) Calculation 
Period 




1 8 36.5 9
2 5 52.5 7
3 2 70.7 5
4 1 82.9 10










Navy human capital is expensive to acquire, grow, incentivize, and retain. Failure 
to optimally signal the most productive officers will result in less effective allocation of 
financial resources. A performance appraisal system that outputs a CPM provides two 
advantages: 1) An additional mechanism to develop and adjust current financial 
management and manpower policies. 2) A means to measure the change in productivity 
as a result of enacted financial and manpower policies.  
The CPM provides a signal of an individual’s cumulative productivity that can be 
quickly referenced and used for financial and manpower policies. Two applications of 
this are retention efforts and force structure realignment. Individuals that are eligible for a 
retention bonus like the Aviation Career Continuation Pay (ACCP) will have varying 
degrees of positive motivation and productivity levels. The combination of the two 





High No incentivize required No incentivize required 
Low Incentive required but not desired by the Navy Incentive required 




Figure 4.  Incentives Required to Retain Individuals Based on Motivation  
and Productivity  
If one of the objectives of the ACCP is to retain the most skilled and productive 
officers then resources should be weighted to those individuals. The CPM allows for 
those highly productive individuals to be identified and polices written to specifically 
address their retention. Currently, ACCP funds are divided among all four quadrants. 
Establishing a CPM cutoff for ACCP eligibility would allow more funds to be available 
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to retain the individuals in the two highest productivity quadrants. Another variation on 
this “pay for performance” idea would be to offer a graduated ACCP amount based on 
CPM values. The more productive an individual, the greater the ACCP bonus they would 
receive. This would allow the same funds to be progressively distributed improving the 
retention of the most productive individuals at the same or less cost to the Navy. 
The CPM provides a means to align the force structure with budgetary 
constraints. In recent years relative comparisons like rankings have become more widely 
used by private business to be able to identify and adjust their workforce as budgets are 
decreased (Olson & Davis, 2003). If financial constraints require downsizing the CPM 
proves a means to retain the highest level of human capital possible and ensure that past 
financial investments in human capital are maximized. 
A fundamental principle of financial management is accountability. The CPM 
provides a means of accountability for current financial and manpower polices. 
Determining the results of an enacted policy can be measured by the change in the macro 
level of productivity whose measurement is facilitated by the CPM. Macro level 
productivity could be determined by calculating the mean CPM for the force, year group 
of department heads, individuals that are opting to depart the Navy vice reenlist, 
Operational Commanders, or some other group. The CPM allows cost benefit questions 
to be answered by measuring the effect of a specific program or policy on productivity. 
The CPM could measure the cost to retain “quality” vice “quantity.” 
A PAS that outputs a CPM provides additional information for Navy leadership to 
make financial and manpower decisions and a means to measure the results of those 
decisions. The ability to identify, train, promote, and retain individuals with the greatest 
potential to improve human capital is possible if the PAS optimally signals productivity. 
Maximizing rating accuracy, using relative comparisons, and developing a CPM are 
needed to improve financial and manpower policies. Future Navy officer human capital 
and productivity levels will be determined today by the Navy’s ability to use the 
performance appraisal system to optimally signal productivity. 
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APPENDIX A. NAVY FITNESS REPORT AND COUNSELING 
RECORD (NAVPERS 1610/2) 
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APPENDIX A (Cont.’d). NAVY FITNESS REPORT AND 
COUNSELING RECORD (NAVPERS 1610/2) 
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APPENDIX C. NAVY MAXIMUM LIMITS ON “EARLY 




1. All summary groups of two can receive one Early Promote and Must Promote. 
2. For E7-E9, W3/W4/W5, and O4, the Must Promote maximum declines by 1 for groups of 6, 16, 26, 
etc., due to arithmetical transfer of a quota to the Early Promote column. Total Early Promote/Must 
Promote quotas remain at 50 percent. 
3. 60 percent combined early and must promote upper limits will become effective 15 March 2011 for 
E5s. 
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APPENDIX D. MARINE MASTER BRIEF SHEET (MCO P1610.7F) 
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APPENDIX E. RATING INSTRUMENT WORD AND  
TOPIC SEARCH CRITERIA 
USN  USMC 
   Word  Total Relevant  Total  Relevant 
Accuracy 
Emphasis 
accuracy  0  0  16  7 
accurate (in‐, ‐ly)  10  2  56  51 
bias (un‐, ‐ed, ‐es)  4  2  1  1 
evaluate (‐d)  31  2  28  15 
evaluating  3  1  8  7 
fair (ly, ness)  9  2  9  8 
inflate (un‐, ‐d)  0  0  50  36 
inflation (ary)  0  0  11  10 
inflating  0  0  1  1 
verifiable  2  2  3  3 
verified  0  0  1  0 
verify  5  0  1  0 
Rater 
Attitude 
attitude  2  0  2  0 
bias (un‐, ‐ed, ‐es)  4  2  1  1 
courage  4  0  19  4 
evaluate (d)  26  0  33  11 
evaluating  5  0  4  4 
fair (ly, ness)  9  2  9  8 
influence (d)  3  0  5  0 
influencing  1  0  0  0 
lever (age, aging)  0  0  1  1 
manpower  3  0  21  4 
motivate (d)  3  3*  4  0 
motivation  0  0  6  0 
personnel  118  0  38  12 
posture  0  0  0  0 
promote (d)  71  0  11  2 
promotion  148  5  74  56 
select (ion)  82  3  33  17 
tool  3  0  20  7 
workforce  10  0  0  0 
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USN  USMC 
   Word  Total Relevant  Total  Relevant 
Rater Training 
educate  0  0  4  2 
education  11  0  37  6 
learn (s, ing)  1  0  8  0 
train (ed, ing)  84  0  64  0 
Fairness 
bias (un‐, ‐ed, ‐es)  4  2  1  1 
discriminate (d)  0  0  2  2 
fair (un‐, ‐ly, ‐ness)  9  2  11  10 
honest (dis‐, ‐ly)  0  0  2  1 
just (un‐, ‐ify, ‐ice, ‐ified, 
‐ifiable)  25  13  5  3 
thorough (ly)  0  0  6  2 
Learning 
learn (‐ing, ‐ed)  1  0  7  0 
determine  15  0  23  0 
gain  9  0  4  0 
get  2  0  8  0 
grasp  2  0  0  0 
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